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Abstract. We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics
and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques
of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed
points of the dynamics and the Nash equilibria. Except for the special case of zero-sum
games one finds a transition as a function of the so-called co-operation pressure between
a phase in which there is a unique stable fixed point of the dynamics coinciding with
a unique Nash equilibrium, and an unstable phase in which there are exponentially
many Nash equilibria with statistical properties different from the stationary state of
the replicator equations. Our analytical results are confirmed by numerical simulations
of the replicator dynamics, and by explicit enumeration of Nash equilibria.
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1. Introduction
Replicator equations (RE) describe the evolution of populations of species interacting
through co-operation and competition. A fitness is assigned to each species, dependent
on the composition the population and on the availability of resources, and species fitter
than average increase in concentration while the weight of species less fit than average
decreases in time. Replicator dynamics (RD) have found widespread applications in
game theory and economics as well as in population dynamics where an equivalence to
Lotka-Volterra equations of theoretical biology can be established [1].
In the context of evolutionary game theory [2] RE describe games which are played
repeatedly and where at any time-step the interaction is between individuals randomly
chosen out of populations of agents. Each player is here taken to follow a pre-
programmed strategy which they cannot change. Over time a payoff is accrued, and
agents reproduce as described above, passing on their strategy to their descendents.
This mechanism can be seen as reinforcement learning from past experience [3].
Prior to the launch of this evolutionary approach to game theory the analysis of games
was mostly concerned with static aspects [4], i.e. with strategically optimal actions by
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fully rational players and the characterization of potential equilibrium points. It is here
assumed that the game is played only once. Players choose potentially stochastically
from a set of available actions, and payoffs are then paid to each participant dependent
on the decisions of all involved players. The key notion of a Nash equilibrium (NE)
then refers to a point in strategy space so that no player can increase his payoff by
unilaterally deviating from this point.
In this paper we extend existing work on single-population random replicator dynamics
[5] in which a transition between stable and unstable regimes has been found as a
function of a so-called ‘co-operation pressure’, and study the case of multi-population
models, i.e. interaction between distinct populations of species. These correspond to
so-called ‘asymmetric’ games [1] in which there is more than one type of player, such as
in the game known as ‘the battle of the sexes’ in which male and female types of agents
have different strategy sets at their disposal. In particular we study the stability of two-
population replicator systems, and the relation to the number of NE in the corresponding
bi-matrix games. We here extend the work of Berg et al [6], who computed the number
and statistics of NE of matrix games with random payoff matrices in the absence of co-
operation pressure and who identified an exponentially large number of NE for all types
of payoff correlations considered, except for the case of zero-sum games in which there
is a unique NE. Our work thus extends the statistical mechanics approach to replicator
systems to the case of multiple populations, and establishes a connection between the
earlier works of [5] and [6].
2. Model definitions
We will consider bi-matrix games between two players, one of type X and one of type
Y , with strategy sets Σx and Σy, and payoff functions µx, µy : Σx × Σy → R. We will
here restrict to the case in which |Σx| = |Σy| = N . Strategies available to players of
type X are labelled by i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the ones available to Y by j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
The extension to more general cases with different numbers of available strategies
is straightforward. Mixed strategies are then probability distributions over Σx and
Σy respectively, described by vectors x = (x1, . . . , xN) and y = (y1, . . . , yN), with
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 and
∑
i xi = 1, and similarly for the {yj}. Pure strategies are recovered as
unit vectors. If player Y plays mixed strategy y then the expected payoff for X ’s pure
strategy i reads νxi (y) =
∑
j µ(i, j)yj. If both players play mixed strategies the expected
payoff for X is denoted by νx(x,y) =
∑
i xiν
x
i (y) and similarly for νy(x,y). A NE is
then a point (x⋆,y⋆) so that νx(x
⋆,y⋆) = maxxνx(x,y
⋆) and νy(x
⋆,y⋆) = maxyνx(x
⋆,y),
and may be characterised by the following conditions
x⋆i [ν
x
i (y
⋆)− νx(x⋆,y⋆)] = 0, νxi (y⋆)− νx(x⋆,y⋆) ≤ 0, ∀i (1)
y⋆j
[
νyj (x
⋆)− νy(x⋆,y⋆)
]
= 0, νyj (x
⋆)− νy(x⋆,y⋆) ≤ 0, ∀j. (2)
The inequalities here ensure that no pure strategy delivers a higher payoff than
obtainable at the Nash point, and the equalities enforce that all pure strategies which
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are actually played with non-zero probability yield the same payoff, and that all other
pure strategies are not employed.
RE of evolutionary game theory assume large populations of X and Y -type players,
respectively, with each individual playing a pre-specified pure strategy. The replicators
are hence the pure strategies of the game under consideration and are copied without
error from parent to child. xi(t) denotes the relative concentration of pure strategy i
in the X-population, and similarly for yj(t). The replicator equations describing the
evolution of the X and Y populations are then as follows
x˙i(t) = xi(t) [ν
x
i (y(t))− κx(t)] , y˙i(t) = yi(t)
[
νyj (x(t))− κy(t)
]
(3)
where the xi(t) and yj(t) are now time-dependent variables, and where κx(t) =∑
i xi(t)ν
x
i (y(t)), and similarly for κy(t) are the average payoffs of the X and Y
type players respectively. The replicator equations preserve the overall normalisation∑
i xi(t) =
∑
j yj(t) = 1 in time. In terms of population dynamics the weights {xi(t)}
and {yj(t)} correspond to relative concentrations of species, and the payoff functions νxi
an νyj may be seen as their respective fitnesses. In a biological setting RD thus describe
the temporal evolution of populations of species, where the concentrations of species
fitter than average grow in and where all other species decrease in relative numbers. In
the remainder of the paper we will use both the game theoretical and the population
dynamical language synonymously. Note that in the two-population system species of
type X interact only with species of type Y and vice versa.
We will in the following be concerned with replicator systems where all entries of the
payoff matrices are Gaussian random variables. Following Peschel and Mende [1] as well
as [5] we will also introduce so-called ‘co-operation pressures’ ux ≥ 0 and uy ≥ 0, and
will consider payoff functions of the form
νxi (x,y) = −2uxxi +
∑
j
aijyj, ν
y
j (x,y) = −2uyyj +
∑
i
bjixi. (4)
The role of ux, uy will be clarified below. For ux = uy = 0 one recovers the cases studied
in [6] (with payoff matrices aij = µx(i, j), bji = µy(i, j)). Both the static and dynamical
properties of bi-matrix games are invariant under global rescaling and shifts of all payoff
matrix elements. Without loss of generality we may therefore assume that the Gaussian
variables aij and bji are drawn from the following statistics
a2ij = b
2
ji =
1
N
, aijbkl = δilδjk
Γ
N
(5)
(with · · · an average over the distribution of payoffs). The scaling with N is here
introduced to guarantee a well defined thermodynamic limit. The parameter Γ
characterises the correlations between the payoff matrices for the two different types
of players. If Γ = −1 then aij = −bji so that the resulting game is a zero-sum game
(at vanishing co-operation pressures), corresponding to a prey-predator relation in the
population dynamical setting. For Γ = 0 one has uncorrelated payoff matrices, and in
the fully symmetric case Γ = 1 the two interacting players always receive equal payoff.
Note also that for convenience we will re-scale the xi and yj such that they obey the
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normalisations
∑N
i=1 xi(t) =
∑N
j=1 yj(t) = N at all times t. The co-operation pressures
ux and uy finally control the growth of individual species, large values of ux drive the
configuration x into the the interior of the simplex defined by
∑
i xi = N, 0 ≤ xi ≤ N ,
and similarly for uy, see the book by Peschel and Mende for further details [1]. Indeed,
inspection of Eqs. (3) for ux, uy → ∞ shows that the RD leads to the fixed point
xi = yj ≡ 1 for all species when started from non-zero concentrations, corresponding
to full co-operation and maximal diversity. In a game theoretic setting large values of
ux, uy favour the use of mixed strategies as opposed to pure strategies located at the
corners of the above simplices.
3. Dynamics: generating functional analysis
On here directly addresses the dynamics described by the replicator equations, and
formulates an effective theory for macroscopic dynamical order parameters. The starting
point of the analysis is the moment generating functional, defined as
Z[ψx,ψy] =
〈〈
exp
(
i
∫
dt
{ N∑
i=1
ψxi (t)xi(t) +
N∑
j=1
ψyj (t)yj(t)
})〉〉
, (6)
where 〈〈. . .〉〉 denotes an average over trajectories of the system, i.e. over solutions of
the replicator equations (3). As usual for disordered systems a closed, but implicit
set of equations describing the temporal evolution of a small number of disorder-
averaged macroscopic order parameters can be derived. In the thermodynamic limit
these observables turn out to be given by the correlation functions Cx(t, t
′), Cy(t, t′),
the response functions Gx(t, t
′), Gy(t, t′) and the Lagrange parameters κx(t), κy(t). The
correlation and response matrices for the X-population are given by
Cx(t, t
′) = lim
N→∞
N−1
N∑
i=1
〈〈xi(t)xi(t′)〉〉, Gx(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
N−1
N∑
i=1
〈〈
δxi(t)
δκx(t′)
〉〉
,(7)
and analogous definitions for Cy, Gy apply. These order parameters are to be determined
self-consistently as averages Cx(t, t
′) = 〈x(t)x(t′)〉⋆, Gx(t, t′) = 〈δx(t)/δκx(t)〉⋆ (and
analogously for Cy, Gy) over realisations of the following pair of coupled stochastic
effective processes
x˙(t) = − x(t)
[
2uxx(t)− Γ
∫ t
t0
dt′ Gy(t, t′)x(t′)− κx(t) + ηx(t)
]
(8)
y˙(t) = − y(t)
[
2uyy(t)− Γ
∫ t
t0
dt′ Gx(t, t′)y(t′)− κy(t) + ηy(t)
]
(9)
with t0 the starting point of the dynamics. The notation 〈. . .〉⋆ refers to an average over
the effective process, i.e. over realisations of the noise variables {ηx(t)} and {ηy(t)}. The
covariances of these noise variables are given by 〈ηx(t)ηx(t′〉⋆ = Cy(t, t′), 〈ηy(t)ηy(t′〉⋆ =
Cx(t, t
′) with no correlations between ηx and ηy. Finally, the Lagrange multipliers
{κx(t)} and {κy(t)} have to be chosen such that the constraints 〈x(t)〉⋆ = 1 and
〈y(t)〉⋆ = 1 are fulfilled at any time t ≥ t0.
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Further progress can be made by assuming a fixed point of the replicator equations, i.e.
by inspecting time-independent solutions x(t) ≡ x, y(t) ≡ y of the effective processes
(leading to constant correlation functions Cx(t, t
′) ≡ qx, Cy(t, t′) ≡ qy and to stationary
response functions Gx(τ), Gy(τ)). Similarly to [5] one derives the following equations
characterising such fixed point states
χx(2ux − Γχy) = g0(∆x) χy(2uy − Γχx) = g0(∆y)
q−1/2y (2ux − Γχy) = g1(∆x) q−1/2x (2uy − Γχx) = g1(∆y)
(qx/qy)(2ux − Γχy)2 = g2(∆x) (qy/qx)(2uy − Γχx)2 = g2(∆y) (10)
with ∆x = κx/
√
qy, ∆y = κy/
√
qx and gn(∆) =
∫ ∆
−∞ dz
e−z
2/2√
2π
(∆ − z)n for n ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
χx is here the integrated response χx =
∫
dtGx(τ), and similarly for χy. A linear
stability analysis shows that such fixed points become unstable at the point at which
(χxχy)
2 = φxφy, leading to an unstable and non-ergodic phase at low co-operation
pressures. For ux = uy, which we will mostly consider in the following, one finds
χx = χy and qx = qy, and Eqs. (10) as well as the stability condition reduce to those of
a single-population replicator system studied in [5]. In the unstable phase solutions of
(10) can no longer be expected to describe the stationary states of the RE accurately.
4. Statics: replica analysis
The starting point of the replica analysis of the statics of the model is the observation
that for symmetric couplings, i.e. aij = bji (Γ = 1) the replicator equations (3)
can be written in the form x˙i = xi (∂xiH(x,y)− κx(t)) and similarly for y˙j, with
H(x,y) = 1
2
∑N
i,j=1 [xiyj(aij + bji)] − ux
∑N
i=1 x
2
i − uy
∑N
j=1 y
2
j , so that the stationary
states of the RD at Γ = 1 correspond to extrema of H. The computation of these is
straightforward and based on the evaluation of −βf = limN→∞N−1lnZ(β). f is here
the disorder-averaged free energy density at temperature T = β−1. Z(β) stands for the
partition function corresponding to H:
Z(β) =
[
N∏
i=1
∫ ∞
0
dxi
N∏
j=1
∫ ∞
0
dyj
]
δ
(
N∑
j−1
xj −N
)
δ
(
N∑
j−1
yj −N
)
e−βH(x,y). (11)
We will not report the details of the straightforward replica calculation, but will only
note that a replica-symmetric ansatz leads to a set of equations identical to (10) at zero
temperature and in the thermodynamic limit (with Γ = 1). For Γ < 1 no Lyapunov
function H can be found and the replica approach is inapplicable.
5. Annealed calculation of the number of Nash equilibria
Finally, the number and statistics of the NE of the corresponding bi-matrix game may
be computed by direct integration over phase space enforcing conditions (1,2) through
suitable delta- and step-functions. It is here convenient to set x˜i = xi if xi > 0 and
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x˜i = −2uxxi+
∑
j aijyj −κx if xi = 0, and similarly for y˜j [6]. The above conditions (1)
may then be written as
Ixi (x˜, y˜) ≡ x˜iΘ(−x˜i)−
(
−2ux˜iΘ(x˜i) +
∑
j
aij y˜jΘ(y˜j)− κx
)
= 0 (12)
and (2) translates into Iyj (x˜, y˜) = 0 with an analogous expression I
y
j (x˜, y˜). Θ(·) is the
step-function. The number of NE at payoffs κx and κy is then given by
N (κx, κy) =
∫
Dx˜Dy˜δ
(∑
i
x˜iΘ(x˜i)−N
)
δ
(∑
j
y˜iΘ(y˜i)−N
)
×
∏
i
δ(Ixi (x˜, y˜))
∏
j
δ(Iyj (x˜, y˜)) | detD|. (13)
detD is a normalising determinant. Performing the disorder-average in an annealed
approximation, one converts the computation into a saddle-point problem in the
thermodynamic limit. We set ux = uy = u for simplicity and find exponential
domination at equal payoff κx = κy = κ and limN→∞ 1N lnN (κ) = S(κ), where
S(κ) = extr{E,R,q,q˜,φ,φ˜}
{
2E − ΓR2 + 2q˜q + 2φ˜φ+ 2 ln
[
H
(
− κ√
q
)
+
e−φ˜√
(2u− ΓR)2 + 2qq˜
×H
(
(2u− ΓR)κ/q + E√
q−1(2u− ΓR)2 + 2q˜
)
× exp
(
−κ
2
2q
+
(E + (2u− ΓR)κ/q)2
4q˜ + 2(2u− ΓR)2/q
)]
+ g
}
(14)
We have here set abbreviated H(x) = 1
2
(
1− erf(x/√2)), and g denotes the contribution
from the normalising determinant, which we do not report explicitly. For u = 0 we
recover the result of [6]. Extremisation of (14) leads to an annealed upper bound of the
logarithmic number of NE at payoff κ.
6. Results
Our results are summarised by figures 1 and 2. Fig. 1a shows the phase diagram of
the bi-population replicator model at different symmetry parameters Γ. For Γ > −1
one finds a transition line, with unique fixed points of the RE at large co-operation
pressures to the top-right, and an unstable regime below. For Γ = −1 no transition is
observed, in this case there is one unique fixed-point of the dynamics for any (ux, uy).
In the remaining figures we restrict to the case ux = uy = u. The transition between the
stable and unstable phases then occurs at co-operation pressure uc(Γ) = (1+Γ)/(2
√
2).
In Fig. 1b we depict typical curves S(κ) of the entropy of NE at payoff κ as obtained
from Eq. (14). These curves typically show a maximum Sm(u,Γ) at intermediate values
of the payoff κ, indicating the number of dominating NE. If Sm > 0 a large number
of Nash equilibria is present in the thermodynamic limit, while for Sm < 0 NE are
exponentially suppressed. If Sm = 0 a single NE prevails [6]. The inset of Fig. 1b shows
a comparison between the analytical results for S(κ) at a fixed combination of u and Γ
with numerical data from an explicit enumeration of NE. We here use a direct support
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Figure 1.
Left: (Colour on-line) Phase diagram of the two-population replicator system. Lines
separate the stable phase (up-right) from the instable one, and are plotted for
Γ = 1, 0.5, 0,−0.5 from top to bottom.
Right: (Colour on-line) Main panel: entropy of number of Nash equilibria for the
uncorrelated game Γ = 0 at u = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 (from top to bottom at the maximum).
Inset: comparison with numerical data from support enumeration (u = 0.1). Upper
curve is the theoretical line, others are from support enumeration of single-population
models at N = 14, 16, 18, 20 (bottom to top). A running average has been performed
to smoothen numerical data.
enumeration scheme, which we apply to an equivalent single-population game in order
to reduce the required computing time. Accessible system sizes are limited to N ≈ 20,
and while results are consistent with the theory, finite size effects can be significant.
Fig. 2a shows the entropy Sm of the dominating NE as a function of u at fixed values
of the symmetry parameter Γ. One finds a large number of NE (Sm > 0) for u < uc(Γ),
and a unique NE above uc (Sm = 0). At uc the spectra S(κ) take their maxima at zero
payoff κ = 0. The transition point uc(Γ) coincides with the one separating the stable and
unstable phases of the RD. Results from an explicit enumeration of NE are consistent
with this transition although direct quantitative comparison between simulations and
theory appears difficult due to finite size effects. An example of raw data obtained from
enumeration of NE is shown in the inset of Fig. 2a.
The saddle point extremisation of (14) allows one also to compute the statistics of the
dominating NE (in the annealed approximation) and to compare with the stationary
states of the RE. We here focus on the order parameter q−1 which serves as a measure
of the diversity of the eco-system [7], with large values of q−1 corresponding to many
surviving species (equivalently many pure strategies played with non-zero probability).
Measurements of q−1 in the stationary states of the RE and numerical results for the
NE are shown in Fig. 2b. The latter are here obtained using a repeated Lemke-
Howson algorithm [8]. Note that the fixed-point theory of the RE applies only above
uc but has been continued below as dashed lines. Quantitative deviations between
numerical and theoretical results for NE are due to finite-size or sampling effects and
the annealed approximation of the theory. The analytical and numerical results show
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Figure 2.
Left: (Colour on-line) Entropy Sm of Nash equilibria as a function of u, for Γ = 0
(left curve) and Γ = 1 (right curve). Solid lines from theory, symbols from explicit
enumeration of single-population systems with N = 20, averaged over 1000 samples.
Inset: Raw data for S(κ) at Γ = 1 for u = 0.9, 0.8, . . . , 0.0 from left to right.
Right: (Colour on-line) Diversity parameter q−1 at Γ = −1, 0, 1 (from left to right).
Solutions of (10) depicted as solid lines where replicator equations have stable fixed
points, continued into the instable phase as dashed lines. Open symbols are results
from simulations of bi-replicator systems with 2N = 1000 species. Dashed-dotted
curves show theory for Nash equilibria for u ≤ uc(Γ), open symbols are numerical
results for typical NE as obtained from iterated Lemke-Howson algorithm applied to
bi-matrix systems of size 2N = 100, averaged over 200 samples.
that the diversity of species in the NE coincides with that at the fixed points of the
RD above uc(Γ), but that they differ from each other below the transition. Very similar
results are found for the number of surviving species. We note that conditions (1,2)
are necessary but not sufficient for the stability of fixed points of the RE so that stable
fixed points are always NE but not necessarily vice versa. Results thus indicate that NE
are statistically distinct from potential stable attractors of the dynamics below uc (and
more numerous). Note also that below uc marginally stable fixed points are suppressed
for Γ < 1 [5] and hence volatile, possibly chaotic behaviour is observed in simulations.
For Γ = 1 the dynamics converges to a fixed point also below uc, but is sensitive to
initial conditions (see also [5, 9]).
7. Summary and concluding remarks
Our results may be summarised as follows: for games different from the zero-sum type
(i.e. for any Γ > −1) one finds a dynamical instability of the fixed points of the two-
population replicator equations at uc(Γ) = (1 + Γ)/(2
√
2). For Γ = 1 this instability
coincides with an AT-instability of the replica symmetric solution of the statics [10].
Above uc all three approaches (dynamics, NE and replica theory where applicable)
lead to the same order parameters, describing an ergodic state, in which there is one
unique NE which coincides with the unique fixed point of the RD (and with the unique
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extremum ofH for Γ = 1). Below uc ergodicity is broken, the stationary state of the RD
is no longer unique, and there is an exponential number of NE. The statistics of the NE
differs from those of the stationary states of the dynamics. The observations generalise
the results of [6], which were concerned with the case of vanishing co-operation pressure
u. At u = 0 the RD is instable for all Γ > −1, and marginally stable for zero-sum
games, Γ = −1. Except for the latter case the system is therefore in the non-ergodic
phase of the RE, in line with the reported exponential number of NE in [6]. At Γ = −1
one is precisely at the phase transition at uc(Γ = −1) = 0 and finds a zero-entropy of
dominating NE.
In conclusion we have investigated bi-matrix games and two-population replicator
systems with tools of disordered systems theory, and have have computed the number
and typical properties of NE and of the fixed points of the corresponding replicator
equations. Several extensions of the present work can be considered, including cases of
correlations between different rows and/or columns of the payoff matrices, populations
with different numbers of strategies at hand and systems with more than two types of
players, as well as the study of other stability concepts of evolutionary game theory in
the context of random replicator systems.
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